

**Bypass**

# Falco

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**Leonardo Di Donato – 20 Nov 2020**



A man with a beard and short dark hair, wearing a dark t-shirt and a red lanyard, is speaking at a podium. He is gesturing with his right hand raised. The background is a plain light-colored wall.

# Whoami

**Leonardo Di Donato**

**Open Source Software Engineer**

**Falco Maintainer**




**Falco**



**sysdig**

**@leodido**  

## A timeline always works fine







# Contents





# Contents

● Rationale





# Contents

- Rationale

- Falco





## Contents

- Rationale
- Falco
  - What's runtime security?





# Contents

- Rationale
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  - What's runtime security?
  - How does it work?





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  - How does it work?
- Bypass!





## Contents

- Rationale
- Falco
  - What's runtime security?
  - How does it work?
- Bypass!
  - /honk





**You gonna get fired for this.  
It's a mistake.**


— my father.



# Prevention + Detection

Use **policies** to **change the behavior** of a process by preventing syscalls from succeeding (also killing the process).

Use **policies** to **monitor the behavior** of a process and notify when its behavior steps outside the policy.





# Prevention is **not** enough.

Combine with runtime detection tools. Use a defense-in-depth  strategy.




# Runtime Security

She's **Kelly**. 💔

I have a lock on my front door and an alarm. She alerts me when things aren't going right, when little bro is misbehaving or if there's someone suspicious outside or nearby.

She detects **runtime anomalies** in my life at home.

**Still...** Bad people were able to defy her and break into my house.






**There is no such thing  
as perfect security.**



# How Falco works?







# Falco rules are **YAML!**<sup>1</sup>



Mark Hamill



Mark Yaml

<sup>1</sup> default rulesets 





# Falco rules are **YAML!**<sup>1</sup>

◉ lists



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# Falco rules are **YAML!**<sup>1</sup>

- ◉ lists
- ◉ conditions



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- ◉ macros



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# Falco rules are YAML!<sup>1</sup>

- ◉ lists
- ◉ conditions
- ◉ macros
- ◉ priorities/severities



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# Falco rules are **YAML!**<sup>1</sup>

- ◉ lists
- ◉ conditions
- ◉ macros
- ◉ priorities/severities
- ◉ (custom) output messages



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# Falco rules are **YAML!**<sup>1</sup>

- ◉ lists
- ◉ conditions
- ◉ macros
- ◉ priorities/severities
- ◉ (custom) output messages
- ◉ tags



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# Falco rules are YAML!<sup>1</sup>

- ◉ lists
- ◉ conditions
- ◉ macros
- ◉ priorities/severities
- ◉ (custom) output messages
- ◉ tags
- ◉ overrides



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# Falco rules are YAML!<sup>1</sup>

- ◉ lists
- ◉ conditions
- ◉ macros
- ◉ priorities/severities
- ◉ (custom) output messages
- ◉ tags
- ◉ overrides
- ◉ exceptions (soon)



Mark Hamill



Mark Yaml

<sup>1</sup> default rulesets 



# Detect attempts to spawn a shell from non-shell applications<sup>2</sup>

```
- rule: Run shell untrusted
  desc: >
  An attempt to spawn a shell below a non-shell application.
  Specific applications are monitored.
  condition: >
    spawned_process
    and shell_procs
    and proc.pname exists
    and protected_shell_spawner
    and not proc.pname in (shell_binaries, gitlab_binaries,
      cron_binaries, user_known_shell_spawn_binaries,
      needrestart_binaries, mesos_shell_binaries,
      erl_child_setup, exechealthz, PM2,
      PassengerWatchd, c_rehash, svlogd,
      logrotate, hhvm, serf, lb-controller,
      nvidia-installe, runsv, statsite, erlexec,
      calico-node, "puma reactor")
    and not proc.cmdline in (known_shell_spawn_cmdlines)
    and not ...
    and not user_shell_container_exclusions
  output: >
    Shell spawned by untrusted binary
    (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid
    shell=%proc.name parent=%proc.pname cmdline=%proc.cmdline
    pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline gparent=%proc.aname[2] ggparent=%proc.aname[3]
    aname[4]=%proc.aname[4] aname[5]=%proc.aname[5]
    aname[6]=%proc.aname[6] aname[7]=%proc.aname[7]
    container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
  priority: DEBUG
  tags: [shell, mitre_execution]
```

```
- macro: spawned_process
  condition: evt.type = execve and evt.dir=<

- list: shell_binaries
  items: [ash, bash, csh, ksh, sh, tcsh, zsh, dash]

- macro: shell_procs
  condition: proc.name in (shell_binaries)

- list: protected_shell_spawning_binaries
  items: [
    http_server_binaries, db_server_binaries, nosql_server_binaries, mail_binaries,
    fluentd, flanneld, splunkd, consul, smbd, runsv, PM2
  ]

- macro: protected_shell_spawner
  condition: >
    (proc.aname in (protected_shell_spawning_binaries)
    or parent_java_running_zookeeper
    or ...
    or possibly_node_in_container)

- list: known_shell_spawn_cmdlines
  items: [
    "sh -c uname -p 2> /dev/null",
    "sh -c uname -s 2>&1",
    "sh -c uname -r 2>&1",
    "sh -c uname -v 2>&1",
    "sh -c uname -a 2>&1",
    "sh -c ruby -v 2>&1",
    ...
    "sh -c /bin/sh -c 'date +%s'"
  ]
```

<sup>2</sup> [rule definition](#) 



# execveat

## demo





# Syscalls: cross and delight

Support them before Falco 1.0 🎯

👉 [falco#676](#)

[@leodido](#)

System call	Kernel	Notes
_llseek(2)	1.2	
_newselect(2)	2.0	
_sysctl(2)	2.0	
accept(2)	2.0	See notes on <a href="#">socketcall(2)</a>
accept4(2)	2.6.28	
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acct(2)	1.0	
add_key(2)	2.6.10	
adjtimex(2)	1.0	
alarm(2)	1.0	
alloc_hugepages(2)	2.5.36	Removed in 2.5.44
arc_gettls(2)	3.9	ARC only
arc_settls(2)	3.9	ARC only
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arch_prctl(2)	2.6	x86_64, x86 since 4.12
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atomic_cmpxchg_32(2)	2.6.34	m68k only
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bpf(2)	3.18	
brk(2)	1.0	
breakpoint(2)	2.2	ARM OABI only, defined with __ARM_NR prefix
cacheflush(2)	1.2	Not on x86
capget(2)	2.2	
capset(2)	2.2	
chdir(2)	1.0	
chmod(2)	1.0	
chown(2)	2.2	See <a href="#">chown(2)</a> for version details
chown32(2)	2.4	
chroot(2)	1.0	
clock_adjtime(2)	2.6.39	
clock_getres(2)	2.6	
clock_gettime(2)	2.6	
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© renameat2  (Falco >= 0.25)

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 [falco#676](#)

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# Missing syscalls

```
#!/usr/bin/env bash
```

```
DRIVER="/home/vagrant/workspace/draios/sysdig/"
```

```
HEADERS="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/build/"
```

```
HEADERQUERY="asmlinkage long sys_"
```

```
SUP=$(grep -oh "__NR_\w*" "${DRIVER}/driver/syscall_table.c" | \
      grep -v ia32 | sed -e "s/__NR_//")
```

```
ALL=$(grep "${HEADERQUERY}" "${HEADERS}/include/linux/syscalls.h" | \
      awk '{print $3}' | sed -e "s/^sys_//" | \
      sed -e "s/(/ /g" | awk '{print $1}')
```

```
sdiff \
  <(echo "${SUP}" | sort | uniq) \
  <(echo "${ALL}" | sort | uniq)
```

## Is tracing syscalls only enough?

👉 **io\_uring**

11	chown16	chown16	
12	chroot	chroot	
13	...		
14	clone	clone	
15		> clone3	
16	close	close	
17	connect	connect	
18		> copy_file_range	
19	creat	creat	
20	...		
21	epoll_wait	epoll_wait	
22	eventfd	eventfd	
23	eventfd2	eventfd2	
24	execve	execve	
25		> execveat	
26	...		
27	fchdir	fchdir	
28	fchmod	fchmod	
29	fchmodat	fchmodat	
30	fchown	fchown	
31	fchown16	fchown16	
32	fchownat	fchownat	
33	...		
34	fork	fork	
35	...		
36	madvise	madvise	
37		> mbind	
38		> membarrier	
39		> memfd_create	
40		> migrate_pages	
41	mkdir	mkdir	
42	mkdirat	mkdirat	
43	...		
44	read	read	
45		> readahead	
46	readlink	readlink	
47	readlinkat	readlinkat	
48	...		
49	rename	rename	16/23
50	renameat	renameat	
51	renameat2	renameat2	



**rename()** renames a file, moving it between directories if required. Any other hard links to the file (as created using **link(2)**) are unaffected. Open file descriptors for **oldpath** are also unaffected.

# How to support a new syscall

## demo

## renameat2 support

If **oldpath** refers to a symbolic link, the link is renamed; if **newpath** refers to a symbolic link, the link will be overwritten.

### renameat()

The **renameat()** system call operates in exactly the same way as **rename()**, except for the differences described here.

If the pathname given in **oldpath** is relative, then it is interpreted relative to the directory referred to by the file descriptor **olddirfd** (rather than relative to the current working directory of the calling process, as is done by **rename()** for a relative pathname).

If **oldpath** is relative and **olddirfd** is the special value **AT\_FDCWD**, then **oldpath** is interpreted relative to the current working directory of the calling process (like **rename()**).

If **oldpath** is absolute, then **olddirfd** is ignored.


The interpretation of **newpath** is as for **oldpath**, except that a relative pathname is interpreted relative to the directory referred to by the file descriptor **newdirfd**.

See **openat(2)** for an explanation of the need for **renameat()**.

### renameat2()

**renameat2()** has an additional **flags** argument. A **renameat2()** call with a zero **flags** argument is equivalent to **renameat()**.

The **flags** argument is a bit mask consisting of zero or more of the following flags:





# Detect package management process ran inside container..

**Error** Package management process launched in container (**user=root user\_loginuid=-1 command=apt update -y container\_id=6640634d89d4 container\_name=testdpkg image=ubuntu:18.04**)

```
- macro: never_true
  condition: (evt.num=0)

- macro: spawned_process
  condition: evt.type = execve and evt.dir=<

- macro: container
  condition: (container.id != host)

- list: deb_binaries
  items: [
    dpkg, dpkg-preconfigu, dpkg-reconfigur, dpkg-divert, apt, apt-get, aptitude,
    frontend, preinst, add-apt-reposit, apt-auto-remova, apt-key,
    apt-listchanges, unattended-upgr, apt-add-reposit, apt-config, apt-cache
  ]

- list: package_mgmt_binaries
  items: [..., deb_binaries, alternatives, pip, pip3, apk, gem, snapd, ...]

- macro: package_mgmt_procs
  condition: proc.name in (package_mgmt_binaries)

- macro: package_mgmt_ancestor_procs
  condition: proc.pname in (package_mgmt_binaries) or
             proc.aname[2] in (package_mgmt_binaries) or
             proc.aname[3] in (package_mgmt_binaries) or
             proc.aname[4] in (package_mgmt_binaries)

- macro: user_known_package_manager_in_container
  condition: (never_true)

- rule: Launch Package Management Process in Container
  desc: Package management process ran inside container
  condition: >
    spawned_process
    and container
    and user.name != "_apt"
    and package_mgmt_procs
    and not package_mgmt_ancestor_procs
    and not user_known_package_manager_in_container
  output: >
    Package management process launched in container
    (user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid command=%proc.cmdline
    container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name
    image=%container.image.repository:%container.image.tag)
  priority: ERROR
  tags: [process, mitre_persistence]
```



# Let's do it again

## demo





**Mitigations/Considerations**

**Advice**



## **Mitigations/Considerations**

## **Advice**

- Monitor symlinks?



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- Containers from scratch

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- Containers from scratch
- Read-only entrypoint



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- Containers from scratch
- Read-only entrypoint
- One data path with no-exec flag

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## Advice

- Containers from scratch
- Read-only entrypoint
- One data path with no-exec flag
- Falco rule to monitor that only the entrypoint executes



## Mitigations/Considerations

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  - Ok, but better if automatic
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  - The effectiveness depends on various rules because rules are interconnected

## Advice

- Containers from scratch
- Read-only entrypoint
- One data path with no-exec flag
- Falco rule to monitor that only the entrypoint executes
- Monitor copies, renames, symlinks, open...

# Close the gate of the (Lua) outputs?

## demo

```
root@ubuntu:~# ls -lah /usr/share/falco/lua
total 96K
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4.0K Oct 21 18:16
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4.0K Oct 21 18:16
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 7.0K Oct 1 14:42 rule_loader.lua
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4.0K Oct 21 18:16 /usr/share/falco/lua
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 15K Oct 1 14:44 lyash.lua
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 7.0K Oct 1 14:42 output.lua
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 9.0K Oct 1 14:42 parser.lua
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 25K Oct 1 14:42 rule_loader.lua
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 6.1K Oct 1 14:42 sleep_rule_analyze.lua
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 3817 Oct 1 14:42 test.lua
root@ubuntu:~# vim /usr/share/falco/lua/output.lua
root@ubuntu:~# cat /dev/null > /dev/null
root@ubuntu:~# touch /dev/null

Wed Oct 21 19:22:25 2020: Loading rules from file /etc/falco/rules_audit_rules.yaml
Wed Oct 21 19:22:25 2020: Starting internal webserver, listening on port 8765

19:22:59.48038322s: Notice Setuid or setgid bit is set via chmod (fd=1045 filename=/tmp/lsr node=5 BROTHIS_BROTHIS_BROTHIS_BROTHIS_BROTHIS user=root
nt user_loginid=1000 process=lsr command=chmod g+ /tmp/lsr testcontainer_id=host container_name=host image=000:000)
Wed Oct 21 19:24:00 2020: SIGUSR1 received, restarting...
Events detected: 1
Male counts by severity:
NOTICE: 1
Triggered rules by rule name:
Set Setuid or Setgid bit: 1
Syscall event drop monitoring:
- event drop detected: 0 occurrences
- num times actions taken: 0
Wed Oct 21 19:24:00 2020: Falco version 0.24.1 (kernel version 2a2860cf9/43902897b11d/ac104040c0e9488a1)
Wed Oct 21 19:24:00 2020: Falco initialized with configuration file /etc/falco/falco.yaml
Wed Oct 21 19:24:00 2020: Loading rules from file /etc/falco/falco_rules.yaml:
Wed Oct 21 19:24:00 2020: Loading rules from file /etc/falco/falco_rules.local.yaml:
Wed Oct 21 19:24:00 2020: Loading rules from file /etc/falco/rules_audit_rules.yaml:
Wed Oct 21 19:24:00 2020: Starting internal webserver, listening on port 8765
```



**Solution?**

# **Remove Lua.**

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# Remove Lua.

- Falco outputs refactoring



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# Remove Lua.

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- Falco outputs improvements

**Solution?**

# Remove Lua.

- Falco outputs refactoring
- Falco outputs improvements
- **TODO**: rewrite Falco rule parser and engine in C++



# Thanks and Honks!

## Does anyone have any questions?



- [twitter.com/leodido](https://twitter.com/leodido)
- [gh:leodido](https://github.com/leodido)
- [gh:falcosecurity/falco](https://github.com/falcosecurity/falco)
- [slack.k8s.io](https://slack.k8s.io), #falco channel

