Anton Marty and the semantics of names
Tuomo Aho, Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki, University of Helsinki, FINLAND

One of the famous issues in philosophical logic and philosophical semantics in the twentieth century has been about the meaning and reference of proper names. There are, roughly, two main parties: descriptive theories, which characterize the meaning of term with descriptions, and non-descriptive theories (with causal theories of reference as a prominent case). Descriptive theory was consciously formulated first by Frege and Russell, whereas the non-descriptive alternative became the focus of debate after Kripke.

Considering this subject, it is interesting to note that there was a similar discussion already much earlier. Anton Marty, the philosopher of language of the Brentano school, studied names in his Untersuchungen (1908). The argument he gave were later elaborated by Landgrebe in his criticism of the linguist Ammann, who held a practically Kripkean view.

Marty admits the causal origin of the use of names, but emphasizes that this shows nothing about their meaning. He attempts to utilize the results of medieval logic and Brentano to show that a name must have also a significative content, and this cannot be purely psychological. Marty defends a consistently descriptive position, but realizes also that it is not unproblematic but requires more thorough analysis. Here he improves Frege by claiming that the field of possible determining descriptions is basically indefinite and not sufficient for logical identification, and it varies according to language-users and contexts. His remarks about possible descriptions touch a couple of rather subtle questions which reappeared in the 1980s. An obvious problem for Marty's approach concerns the communication between people who join different descriptions to the names they use. In this issue, Marty comes close to some ideas later developed by Grice.

Leon Chwistek (1884-1944) and his Constructive Type Theory
Hubert Bozek, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Pedagogical University of Cracow, Kraków, POLAND

In my paper I wish to discuss some aspects of the Constructive Type Theory (CTT) first formulated in 1922 by a polish logician, philosopher and painter, Leon Chwistek (see: Chwistek, 1922, 1923, 1924) The focal point of Chwistek’s criticism of the classic Eextended Type Theory, was the Axiom of Reducibility, adopted by Russell (see: Russell & Whitehead, 1910, p.):

\[
(\exists \alpha) \forall (x, y) \alpha(x, y) \Rightarrow \psi(x, y)
\]

stating that for any predicative function ?! there is a corresponding formally equivalent propositional function \(\psi\). The philosophical ratio for that rejection on the part of Chwistek was the conviction that the axiom in question contains an ad hoc existential supposition, which in turn contradicted his logicist approach in the foundation of mathematics. The affiliation to logicism was dictated by certain ideal of rationality, which I will briefly present.

According to Jan Wolenski the CTT by Chwistek is “the formally most perfected” example of logicism (see: Wolenski, 1987, p. 145). At the same time, it clearly demonstrates how strongly is the work of a logician influenced by his/hers philosophical background. These last two statements combined together lead to the question, of whether logicism can indeed be upheld, let alone form a logico-philosophical point of view (not to mention matemathematical or metamathematical perspective), for if it assumes any grounds other than logical for adopting or rejecting propositions, can it still be justifiably called logicism? Arguing from the case of Chwistek I wish to present the preliminary answer to this question.

Literature:


Wolenski, Jan: Krytyka rozszerzonej teorii typów logicznych we wczesnych pracach Leona Chwistka [w] „Ruch Filozoficzny” ,t. XLIV nr 2. (1987).
On some unknown ideas by Sobocinski: comments on philosophical applications of Lesniewski's systems
Kordula Swietorzecka, Logic, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University, Warsaw, POLAND
Marek Porwolik, Methodology of Science, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University, Warsaw, POLAND

Boleslaw Sobocinski was a close collaborator of Stanislaw Lesniewski and a consequent propagator of his protothetics, ontology and mereology. In relation to these interests, Sobocinski worked on new formulations of these systems and their axiomatisations. Some of his results were published and confronted with Lesniewski's original formalism, however we also know of the existence of papers devoted to these ideas, which were lost during the Second World War (as was the case with his development of protothetics). In connection with ongoing historical research, the authors present some unknown results formulated by Sobocinski and described in correspondence with J. M. Bochenski in the late forties and early fifties of the twentieth century (few comments on these letters were already made by Jan Wolenski). Unpublished archival material will be compared with published texts of Sobocinski, especially those focusing on ontology and mereology. Our comparative analysis will be linked to the original philosophical views of Lesniewski. In particular, we will consider his argumentation against the possibility of the existence of universals in connection with its formalization by Sobocinski, as given in the original new formal frame of Lesniewski's ontology. Secondly, certain ideas of Sobocinski on applying mereology to theodiceal questions will be discussed.

Bibliography
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Gentzen's 'Finitist' Interpretation in the Context of the Formalism-Intuitionism Controversy
Yuta Takahashi, Faculty of Letters, Keio University, Tokyo, JAPAN

Kreisel, in his review of the collected papers of Gerhard Gentzen by edited Szabo, had thrown light on the following aspect of Gentzen's first (posthumously published) consistency proof: to assign a 'finitist' sense to each theorem of classical arithmetic. After Kreisel's remark, several studies have been made on this 'finitist' interpretation, which is often thought to be a precursor of the method of extracting constructive contents from proofs of classical arithmetic. In the present paper, we put this interpretation in the historical context of the formalism-intuitionism controversy. Specifically, we aim to achieve the following three objectives. First, we explain that the 'finitist' interpretation by Gentzen's first proof had the role of responding to intuitionists' objection against the significance of formalist consistency proofs. The objection runs as follows: formalist consistency proofs for classical mathematics are of no significance, because its theorems remain meaningless even if such proofs are given. Second, we argue that the role of responding to the intuitionistic objection can be found in Hilbert's methods of consistency proofs as well. It can be found not only in the method of consistency proofs invented by Hilbert's Program but also in the method of ‘semantic’ consistency proofs presented by the later paper "Beweis des Tertium non datur"(1931). Finally, by examining Sieg's analysis of Gentzen's unpublished manuscripts, we claim that Gentzen in fact inherited the above role of consistency proofs from Hilbert. Achieving these objectives, we attempt to take a step toward an explanation for the historical background of Gentzen's 'finitist' interpretation.