The Normative Aspect of Naturalistic Philosophy of Science
Leena Tulkki, Philosophy, History, Culture and Art, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, FINLAND

The aim of this paper is to lay ground for meta-philosophical discussion about the normative dimension of current philosophy of science. After the naturalistic turn in the 90’s, many philosophers of science consider empirical information about scientific practice essential for their theorizing. Lately some philosophers of science have used experimental methods to study scientific concepts such as gene and innateness. This trend towards more empirically oriented research raises a question: how does naturalistic philosophy of science differ from scientific, i.e. sociological, studies of science? One answer is that philosophy of science, even in its naturalistic form, has a distinctively normative dimension. However, scientists themselves engage in debates about meta-level issues concerning their own field, including normative questions about how research should be done. Just as descriptive philosophy of science should, for a naturalist, form a continuum with scientific science studies, perhaps normative philosophy of science should also be connected to the actual concerns of scientists. This seems to not always be the case, as some naturalists have pointed out. If philosophers of science want to make useful normative contributions to science, they need to integrate their work to the meta-level discussion already practiced in the particular fields of science and justify their normative claims in a way that the community of scientists in that field would find plausible. I will discuss the role of philosophers in this scenario and the implications for the field of philosophy of science as a whole.

Philosophy is Alive and Well: Who’s Afraid of Intertheoretic Reduction?
Dennis Apolega, Philosophy, De La Salle University Manila, Manila, PHILIPPINES

The status of philosophy has been put to question, but more recently with Stephen Hawking’s pronouncement that philosophy is dead. However, philosophers have argued that the there is a chasm regarding the concerns of philosophy and the concerns of science. Philosophers like Thomas Nagel take this chasm to show what is distinctive about philosophy from science. For Nagel, this is a distinction with a difference for it highlights the autonomy of philosophy. If philosophers like Nagel are right then Hawking would be wrong. Hawking’s pronouncement would follow if it is true that physics has taken over the concerns of philosophy.

Hawking might not be aware of it but his pronouncement, barring inaccuracies regarding philosophers not keeping up with advancements in science, depends on one of purported implications of intertheoretic reduction. Indeed, the resistance to intertheoretic reduction can be situated within some of the fears surrounding intertheoretic reduction. One can be located in Nagel and the distinctness of philosophy from science, for what would philosophy be if it were not distinct? Another would be physicalism and some of the
implications that it entails. Another philosopher who has voiced similar fears is Alvin Plantinga.

This paper contends that there need not be such fears. To support this view, Mayr’s (1988; 2004) views on the autonomy of biology will be discussed while keeping aware of the intricacies of intertheoretic reduction and the implications of physicalism. Canonically one usually turns to philosophical discussions of issues raised by physics; perhaps it is time for philosophy to take its cue from biology.

Rather than thinking of these fears as leading to the death of philosophy, the paper views the issues raised by intertheoretic reduction as reinvigorating philosophy in general, with philosophy of science as the fertile ground for further renewed discussions in metaphysics and epistemology.

**Philosophy as "anything goes": A Critical Analysis of the Problem**

Blazej Gebura, Department of Philosophy, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Lublin, POLAND

Some thinkers claim that the choice of philosophical methods is highly arbitrary. For example, Nicholas Rescher defends the view in which there are many of equally good methodological orientations in philosophy. In my presentation I want to discuss possible formulations and metaphilosophical consequences of such claim. The latter would be the relations between such view and the question of the nature of philosophical arguments. I want to show, how accepting such "Anything goes" claim would affect the possible answers for philosophical investigations on what arguments of philosophy are. To do so, I will make some comments on the antoher profound question: What kind of discipline is metaphilosophy.