Could there be no logic?
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Logical pluralists and monists disagree about how many correct logics there are; the pluralists say there are many, the monists that there is only one. But could it turn out that there is no correct logic? This paper develops the argument for what I'll call logical nihilism by presenting new counterexamples to laws sometimes thought to be quite safe—such as conjunction elimination and identity. Then it argues on general methodological grounds that the best response to this nihilist threat is to relinquish commitment to complete generality in logic.

Logic Revision: Some Formal and Semi-Formal Techniques for Logic Choice
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Building on my recent work on probabilities for very weak non-classical logics, I develop a general semantic framework for rational logic choice. The framework is used to provide a basis for (i) a probabilist theory of logic revision, (ii) a theory of rational debate about logic, and (iii) a theory of negotiation concerning the logic a group or community is to accept. Techniques from formal semantics, simulation theory (from the philosophy of mind), formal pragmatics, and theories of dialogue are employed in developing this theory of logic choice.